Rebecca Jane Chadwick v. Talmage Nielsen, M.D. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
Rebecca Jane Chadwick v. Talmage Nielsen, M.D. :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Stewart M. Hanson, Francis J. Carney; Suitter, Axland, Armstrong & Hanson; attorneys for
respondent.
David R. Daines; Daines & Plowman; attorney for appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Chadwick v. Nielsen, No. 880196.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2141
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUhL.,! 
K F U 
50 
DOCKET NO. Yf-D/f(.~f4> 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REBECCA JANE CHADWICK, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
TALMAGE NIELSEN, M. D. , 
Defendant and Respondent. 
88-0196-C/ 
) 
* 
) 
* 
) 
* 
) 
Supreme Court 
No. 20733 
BRIEF OF APPEJLLANT 
* * * * * * 
APPEAL FROM JUDGEMENT 0F THIRD DISTRICT 
COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, HON. J. DENNIS FREDRICK 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr. , Esq. 
Francis J. Carney, Esq. 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Seventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
David R. Daines 
DAINES & PLOWMAN 
U.S. U. Box 1388 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorney for Plaint if 
and Appellant 
JAN 161936 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REBECCA JANE CHADWICK, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
TALMAGE NIELSEN, M. D. , 
De fend ant and Res pond ent. 
) 
* 
) 
* 
) 
* 
) 
* 
) 
* 
* 
) 
Supreme Court 
No. 20732 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* • - * * * * * 
APPEAL FROM JUDGEMENT OF THIRD DISTRICT 
COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, HON. J. DENNIS FREDRICK 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr. , Esq. 
Francis J. Carney, Esq. 
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
175 South West Temple, Seventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
David R. Daines 
DAINES & PLOWMAN 
U.S.U. Box 1328 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorneys for Defendant sand 
Respondent 
Attorney for Plainti 
and Appellant 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Canterbury v. Spence. 464 F 2d 722, 
(D.C. Cir. 1972). 
Hudson v. Moor. 239 Ala.130, 194 
So. 147 (147). 
Jennings v. Stoker. 625 P. 2d 912 
(Utah 1982). 
Miller v. Kennedy. 522 p. 2d 852 
(Wash 1974). 
Nixdorf v. Hicken. 612 P.2d 348 
(Utah I960). 
SiaiUIES: 
U. R.C.P. rule 15(b). 
U. R. E. rule 56(1) & (2). 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 Sec. 78-14-6. 
16 
10 
A 9, 
16 
10 
20 
22 
18 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
ISSUE Is 
THE "LAY" EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD OF MISREPRESENTATION AND 
CONCEALMENT OF THE MATERIAL FACTS OF THE INNER VEIN SYSTEM 
OBSTRUCTION IS "COMPETENT" AND ESTABLISHES A "PRIMA FACIE 
CASE" ON THAT COUNT INCLUDIN6 GROUNDS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
ISSUE II: 
ALTERNATIVELY, THERE WAS A PRIMA FACIE CASE BASED ON: (A) 
THE FACT THAT THE PROPRIETY OF THE TREATMENT RECEIVED IS 
WITHIN THE COMMOM KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE OF LAYMEN; (B) 
EXPERT EVIDENCE OF DR. NIELSEN AND OTHERS; (C) WRITTEN 
ASSURANCES THAT HE WOULD NOT OPERATE IF THE INNER VEIN WAS 
OBSTRUCTED AND OF POSITIVE RESULTS; AND (D) LACK OF 
INFORMED CONSENT. 
A. The propriety of the treatment received is within 
the common knowledge and experience of laymen. 
B. There was ample "expert" evidence on cross 
examination of D^m Nielsen and his and other 
expert admission in the medical record entered 
by Nielsen to establish a standard of canre and 
its breach. 
C. Dr. Nielsen's signed letter to Dr. Daines is a 
writing signed by him giving assurance that he 
would not operate if the test results showed 
obstruction and assurance that if he did operate 
there would be a good result. 
D. The same evidence which establishes an Issue I 
cause of action for non—disclosure with equal or 
greater force establishes a cause on lack of 
i nformed consent• 
ISSUE III: 
THE COURT ERRED IN (A) DENYING A MOTION TO AMEND THE 
COMPLAINT TO ADD CAUSES OF ACTION; (B) RESTRICTINC 
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DR. NIELSEN ON THE TEST RESULTS, 
AND (C) BY REFUSING TO ALLOW THE FATHER TO TESTIFY AS Al 
EXPERT ON THE HYDRAULIC PRINCIPLES. 
A. The Trial Court erred in denying Chadwick's motion 
to amend the complaint adding counts to conform to 
the evidence produced by Nielsen at the first non-
jury bi—frucated trial. 
iii 
The Trial Court erred by refusing right of cross-
examination of Dr. Nielsen on why he proceeded 
with surgery when the test showed obstruction. 
The Trial Court erred in ruling that Mr. Chadwick 
did not possess sufficient expertise so that he 
could testify as to the hydraulic principles 
related to the veins as a system for removal of 
blood from the leg. 
iv 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is a malpractice action in which Plaintiff and 
Appellant, hereafter "Chadwick", claimed that the Defendant and 
Respondent, hereafter "Dr. Nielsen", committed acts of 
malpractice in treating the plaintiff for a circulatory 
condition in her leg by surgical removal of veins. 
The trial was bi-frucated. The question of the statute of 
limitations was heard first by the trial court sitting without 
jury. The Court ruled in Chadwick's favor on the statute of 
limitations questions. Between the two hearings, Chadwick 
moved, based on evidence adduced by Dr. Nielsen at the first 
hearing, to amend the complaint adding a cause of action for 
intentional concealment and requested punitive damages, and also 
requested relief from the partial summary judgment regarding a 
written warranty. These motions were denied. 
The remaining issues were tried before a jury, and after the 
presentation of Chadwick's evidence, the trial court granted Dr. 
Nielsen's motion for a directed verdict. 
(Factual Summary)s Chadwick consulted Dr. Nielsen for 
treatment of a condition that created some discomfort on extreme 
exertion in her left leg and that created no functional 
disability. Dr. Nielsen treated her, surgically removing the 
saphenous vein in her leg which resulted in major permanent 
bodily impairment and functional disability. Before the 
surgery, Chadwick and her father insisted on a test which would 
disclose significant surgical risks if the deep vein system in 
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the leg was obstructed by extensive surgery on the same leg 
during infancy. Dr* Nielsen made oral and written guarantees 
that he would not perform the surgery if the test showed that 
there was an obstruction of the inner vein. He also confirmed 
in writing that he expected only positive results which was 
consistent with his oral representations. The test results 
given to Dr* Nielsen revealed a chronic obstruction of the inner 
venous system. Dr. Nielsen fraudulently concealed from 
Chadwick, Dr. Daines and her father and misrepresented the 
results of the test showing chronic obstruction of the inner 
veinous system and proceeded with the surgery. Though Dr. 
Nielsen represented that Chadwick would return to full use of 
her leg within two weeks, she has suffered serious permenant 
impairment and disability resulting from chronic swelling 
because the surface vein system was removed and the inner system 
obstructed. Dr. Nielsen abandoned her in January, 1980 and 
continued to conceal the test results until the first day of 
trial. 
(More Detailed Facts:) Chadwick was a single 24 year old 
living at home, who had just completed college and was ready to 
enter the job market. She was still carried on her father's 
health insurance program. He was her health care decision maker 
(TR4-17 pp 4, 5, 56 and 65). Just prior to taking a job in 
Washington D.C. she consulted with Dr. Nielsen concerning a 
possible circulatory problem in her leg on September 13, 1979. 
Both parents accompanied her to the appointment, but remained in 
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the waiting room during the consultation. The reason for the 
visit was that Chadwick had experienced some minor discomfort in 
her left leg on extreme exertion, which she and her parents 
thought might be related to the extensive surgery on the leg 
when she was an infant. There was an extensive scar ^nd a small 
bump at one point below the scar, but no functional disability 
of the leg (TR4-16 pp. 99-101 and TR4-17 pp. 3, 45, & 58). Dr. 
Nielsen recommended surgical removal of one of the two principal 
veins of the leg as treatment and scheduled Chadwick for 
surgery, called a phlebectomy. When she advised her father of 
the planned surgery in the waiting room, he went into Dr. 
Nielsen and insisted that prior to any surgery a test be taken 
to insure that the inner veins had not been obstructed by the 
surgery she had in infancy and remaining veins could carry the 
overload flow resulting from the removal of the surface flow 
vein system (TR4—17 pp. 6, 7). The father also insisted that 
the records of the infancy surgery be obtained from Seattle and 
reviewed before any decision was made to proceed with surgery 
(TR4—17 pp. 9, SI—63). Though Dr. Nielsen did not suggest 
either of these, he ordered the phleborheogram and reviewed the 
Seattle medical records. He confirmed in a letter to Dr. Daines 
that he would not proceed with surgery if tests showed the inner 
vein system was abnormal i.e., obstructed. The test report is 
Ex. #1 Dr. Nielsen, p. 4, also Annex page 2, hereafter "fl p. 1". 
Test results over Dr. Swensen9s signature establishes that the 
inner vein system in Chadwick9s left leg was abnormal in that it 
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was chronically obstructed. The results of the test were not 
disclosed to Chadwick until the first bi-furcated trial, 
Chadwick and her father both testified that they would not have 
consented to the surgical removal of the saphenous vein if they 
had known that the inner veins were obstructed as reflected by 
the test report (ftp. 1; TR4-17 p. 82). Dr. Nielsen orally 
represented that there were no risks associated with the surgery 
that the inner vein test results were "good" and assured 
Chadwick that she would be able to return to normal use of her 
leg within eleven days (TR4-17 p. 11 lines 18—24). Following 
the operation, Chadwick5s leg suffered severe swelling and pain. 
Her functional disability after the operation was such that she 
had to lay down with her leg elevated virtually twenty—four 
hours a day for seven months and then was only able to be up and 
about some after a family relative and physician suggested 
Chadwick try and get Dr* Nielsen to prescribe a special made—to-
order Jobst stocking. ft second physician suggested that she 
could take up to 12 aspirin a day to alleviate her aggravated 
swelling and painful condition (TR4—17 p. 34 line 6, 7). The 
pain and swelling following the operation prevented her from any 
employment the first year and only partial employment for an 
additional three years. She was also unable to engage in social 
and normal activities associated with her personal life during 
that time. Though at the time of trial she had recovered 
sufficiently to teach school, she had to curtail her normal 
personal activities in order to teach (TR4—17 p. 37-38). In 
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the post—operative care phase, Dr. Nielsen continued his 
concealment of the pre—operative test results until March 1985. 
After the operation, he refused to acknowledge to Chadwick or 
treat the serious swelling and the resulting disability and thus 
abandoned Chadwick as a patient. See Ex. 1 Dr. Nielsen p. 5 
also Annex pg. 4, hereafter "A p. 4" and TR4-17 p. 20, 21, 22, 
line 16-21, p. 65 line 19-22, p. 52 line 23. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The general assignment of error is the Trial Court's 
erroneous Findings and Conclusions that Chadwick "produced no 
competent evidence" and "failed to establish a prima facie case" 
on any of her causes of action for malpractice in the complaint 
(R—236 and 237) and the proposed amended complaint (R—79). The 
Trial Court's erroneous rationale for its conclusions was that 
Chadwick had failed to produce a live medical expert witness 
other than Dr. Nielsen to establish a standard of care, a breach 
of that standard, damages and other medical expert opinion 
"facts" essential to a prima facie case (TR4—17 p. 92 and 93). 
In the subsequent issues it will be clearly established that 
Chadwick did, contrary to the Trial Courts findings, establish 
by "competent evidence" a prima facie case on all causes of 
action. Conceededly, the Trial Court's rationale correctly 
states a "general rule" applicable in "most" malpractice 
actions. As will be later demonstrated, under well defined law 
there was indeed the requisite expert testimony and also facts 
which brings this case within exceptions to the general rule. 
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The Trial Court erred in failing to recognize in this case 
exceptions to the general rule which dispense with the 
requirement of expert testimony when failure to disclose or 
misrepresentation of material facts are alleged. (Issue I). 
Another exception applicable here is where the controlling 
medical principles are common lay knowlege. Laymen know that 
when there a\r^ only two principal veins to return blood flow 
from the leg and one is obstructed, you do not remove the other 
vein. Any supposed requirement for "expert" evidence to 
establish a standard of care, breach, cause, damages or other 
facts was satisfied by the cross examination of Dr. Nielsen and 
his and other experts written statements in the record. Written 
assurances that Dr. Nielsen would not operate if the vein was 
obstructed and that the results would be positive, satisfy 
statutory requirements for a prima facie case on contractual 
breach theory. There was also a prima facie case on lack of 
informed consent arising from the misrepresentation and 
concealment of the test results. These alternatives to Issue I 
as prima facie causes of action are all covered under Issue II. 
The Trial Court erred in denying Chadwick's motion to amend the 
complaint to add causes of action arising from evidence offerred 
and received from Dr. Nielsen at the first bi—frucated trial. 
The Court erroneously limited cross-examination of Dr. Nielsen 
on the test result issues, and in error refused to recognize 
Chadwick's father as an expert witness in the hydraulic 
principles applicable to the case. (See Issue III). 
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ARGUMENTS 
ISSUE I 
THE "LAY" EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD OF MISREPRESENTATION AND 
CONCEALMENT OF THE MATERIAL FACTS OF THE INNER VEIN SYSTEM 
OBSTRUCTION IS "COMPETENT" AND ESTABLISHES A "PRIMA FACIE 
CASE" ON THAT COUNT INCLUDING GROUNDS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
This Court in Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 p. 2d 348, (Utah 1980) 
set forth the law defining a prima facie case on non-disclosure 
malpractice causes of action and dispensed with the expert 
testimony requirement- When applied to the evidence in this 
case, Nixdorf 612 P.2d 348 established that Chadwick proved (far 
more) than a mere minimum prima facie case on her cause of 
action for Dr. Nielsen's failure to disclose to her the abnormal 
and chronic obstruction of the leg's inner \/eiri system prior to 
his surgical removal of the outer vein system. 
The following comparison of the material proof elements 
between the instant case and the facts in Nixdorf 612 P. 2d 348 
demonstrate that in this case, the misconduct material to the 
non-disclosure (and fraudulent misrepresentation) are 
significantly more aggrevated And clearly rise to the level of 
fraud, misrepresentation and willful disregard by D\rm Nielsen of 
the health of Chadwick justifying punitive damages. 
One need only replace the "needle" with "obstructed inner 
veins" to directly apply Nixdorf 612 P.2d 348 "fiduciary duties 
to disclose" to this case, as follows at pages 354 and 355: 
"The trial court also erred in not submitting 
to the jury the plaintiff's second cause of 
action, concerning the doctor's failure to 
disclose the presence of the needle. The 
relationship between a doctor and his patient 
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creates a duty in the physician to disclose 
to his patient any material information 
concerning the patient's physical condition. 
This duty to inform stems from the fiduciary 
nature of the relationship and the patient's 
right to determine what shall or shall not 
be done with his body. 
The scope of the duty is defined by the 
materiality of the information in the decisional 
process of an ordinary individual. If a 
reaonable person in the position of the 
plaintiff would consider the information 
important in choosing a course of treatment 
then the information is material and 
disclosure required. 
Once the duty to disclose certain information 
is established, then the physician's total 
breach of that duty, as found in the present 
case, presents to the jury the question of 
what damages were proximately caused by the 
breach. Where the physician fails to disclose 
to his patient any information concerning 
a material fact, there is no question of 
skill and judgment, no question of practice 
beyond the knowledge of laymen which must be 
established through expert testimony. To 
borrow Justice Wiest's much quoted phrase 
from Balance, even the "merest tyro" would 
know the nondisclosure was improper. 
Damages which may be shown to follow as a 
proximate case of the nondisclosure include 
reasonable charges for discovery and removal 
of the needle and monetary compensation for the 
mental anguish following the realization of the 
needle's presence." 
This holding directly addresses only the fiduciary duty to 
disclose. Its rationale and footnoted citations lead us beyond 
the fiduciary realm and into the law and precedent applicable to 
the aggrevated facts of this case. This dictum interfaces mere 
"non—disclosure" with breach of agreement to inform, fraudulent 
concealment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and reckless 
disregard for safety of the patient and punitive damages. 
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(Nixdorf 612 P.2d 348 footnote no- 24 at page 355) 
"See Taylor v. Milton, supra note 6; the present 
factual situation could also be used to establish 
a cause of action in fraudulent concealment. 
Where a physician has knowledge of a fact 
concerning the pat ient' s physica1 cond it ion 
which is material to that patient and he fails 
to disclose it the confidence relationship 
between them creates a duty to disclose which 
may render his silence fraudulent. See 
Hudson v- Moor, 239 Ala. 130, 194 So. 147 
(1940)." 
Taylor v. Milton, 353 Mich. 421, 92 N.W. 2d 57, (1958) 
A factual comparison of the material elements demonstrate 
that in this case on each element regarding "non—disclosure" the 
prima facie case was significantly stronger than in Nixdorf, 612 
P.2d 348. There, the duty to disclose the needle's presence 
necessarily arose only from the fiduciary relationship between 
physician and patient because the patient had no other way of 
discovering either the needle's presence or its relationship to 
her post—operative pain. On the other hand in this case, 
Chadwick, her father and Dirm Nielsen had pre—determined and 
agreed that the inner obstruction test be performed. 
There is also written evidence that it was pre—agreed by 
all that if the test showed any inner vein obstruction the 
surgery would not be performed. See letter of 9/14/79 Exhibit 1 
Dr. Nielsen page 4, also Annex page 2, hereafter "A p.2". 
Here, it was Chadwick, who expressly demanded the inner vein 
obstruction test so she could "decide what shall or shall not 
be done with her body." i.e. Whether to allow removal of the 
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surface veins if the test showed the obstruction of the inner 
veins, footnote 19. (Nixdorf 612 P.2d 348 at page 354.) 
"Schloendorff v Society of New York Hospital, 
211 N.Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914); see also 
Miller v Kennedy, supra note 15, 522 P. 2d at 
860. In Miller the court explained, "The 
patient is entitled to rely upon the physician 
to tell him what he needs to know about the 
condition of his own body. The patient has the 
right to chart his own destiny, and the doctor 
must supply the patient with the material facts 
the patient will need in order to intelligently 
chart that destiny with dignity." 
The Misrepresent at ions; 
The way Nielsen chose to articulate his misrepresentation 
of test findings to Chadwick was by simply claiming they were 
"good" when in fact they were "bad" (TR 4-16 p. 55 lines 16 to 
19). He carefully avoided any reference to the important terms 
employed in his discussions with the father and in his September 
14 pre—operative report to Dr. Daines. Pre—operatively to 
Daines he used the same key test finding language found in the 
test report i.e.: "no obstruction". and "normal" as the test 
findings expected in the letter to Dr. Daines (A p.2). Nielsen, 
in justifying to Chadwick his "good" conclusion quite clearly 
avoided the use of "normal" and "no—obstruct ion" terminology 
which she knew and understood. He evasively switched his 
discussion exclusively to "dampening of respiratory waves" which 
meant nothing to her especially when coupled with Nielsens false 
conclusion that the test results were "good" (TR 4—16 p. 55; TR 
4-17 p. 10). 
Post operatively on October 5, in his report to Dr. Daines 
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(ft p.3) he employed the same form of deception in explaining the 
test results where he again masked the "bad" test findings of 
"abnormal" and "chronically obstructive". With Dr. Daines he 
did not limit his deception to use of "dampening of respiratory 
waves". He so easily could and should have included a one page 
copy of the test report with the letter to Dr. Daines, a 
"radiologist", who is a specialist at both making and 
interpreting similar reports, but did not. There is persuasive 
evidence that Drm Nielsen knew Dr*, Daines would have immediately 
recognized the gross inconsistency between the "obstruction" and 
"abnormal" findings in the report (ft p.1) and the normal and no 
obstruction findings expected by Nielsen in the September 14 
pre—operat i ve 1 et t er t o Dai nes (ft p. £)« 
However, with Dr^m Daines it was not as easy to misrepresent 
with a simple "good" when the results were, in fact, "bad". In 
his fradulent misrepresentations to Daines, Nielsen stated that 
the test showed as follows: 
"We did a phleboreogram to make sure that the deep 
system was not occluded and this showed that there 
was dampening of the pulse wave probably due to 
sber (sic) intrapment but no luminal occlusion 
(A p. 3). 
This is a fraudulent misrepresentation of the test results. 
ft dictionary definition and comparison of the test report (ft 
p.1); the September 14 letter (ft p.2), the October 5 letter (A 
p.3), and his January 8, 1980 notes (ft p.4) show that for 
purposes of this test "occlusion", "obstruction" and 
"thrombosis" are essentially equivelant terms for purposes of 
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Chadwick's inner vein condition. It was four days after the 
October 5 letter, on October 9 that the leg wrappings were 
removed by Dr. Nielsen (ft p.4). Immediately after Chadwick left 
his office, the disabling swelling set in and has persisted to 
this date. Dr*m Nielsen ney/eir reported again to Dr. Daines after 
the chronic swelling problem was "unwrapped", but he continued 
to keep the test results "wrapped up". 
D)rm Nielsen's "private" notes made in his records after 
Chadwick and her parents left his office for the last time on 
January 8 (ft p. 4) aur^ a self—indictment as to all Chadwick's 
claims if read in connection with the pre—operative Test Report 
of September 14, 1979 (ft p.2), which was also in his file. 
However, if that Test Report could have been effectively 
concealed, then those notes would have been a rather clever 
further suppression of his pre—operative misconduct regarding 
the test results. 
"Patient and her family came in to talk about her problem" 
(ft p.4). He admits that over three months after operation she 
had "problems" after promising her pre—operatively that she 
would be back to the full use of her leg fourteen days after the 
operation. 
"The details were explained to her, namely, that she has 
some degree of extrensic entrapment of the deep vein just above 
the knee where the operation was performed in infancy (ft p.4). 
"ftccording to Nielsen's records, this is the first time he even 
claimed to advise her of deep vein "entrapment" or "obstruction" 
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or "occlusion" or "thrombosis". The possibility of this hidden 
condition was the reason why the father insisted on the pre-
operative test, it was confirmed by the test, concealed and 
misrepresented by Nielsen. An acknowledgement that this 
"condition" is indeed the cause of the disabling swelling. 
Chadwick and her parents emphatically deny that he ever 
"explained" this to her. Their version of his statements at the 
visit were assurances that her basic problems were not real but 
imagined and would dissappear in the reasonably near future when 
her attitude improved. He could see no good reason for future 
appointments; he did not suggest she see An expert, explore 
opening the deep vein entrapment or restoring the stripped 
surface vein, in truth there is no remedy, he just abandoned 
her. 
"We have no direct evidence that there has been an 
occlusion at this point." (A p. 4) He must have considered at 
this time that he would ultimately be successful in concealing 
from Chadwick the test results (A p.1) The test report is the 
pre—agreed direct evidence certified by Swensen, with superior 
expertise to Nielsen that there was an obstruction, and that all 
other "experts" must treat her accordingly until "proved" (not 
second guessed) otherwise (A p.1). The balance of his 
record entries for January 8, 1980 outline the extent to which 
he was willing to adknowledge the extent of her injuries, 
physical impairments and the absence of any prognosis for 
improvement. 
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In concluding his January 8, 1980 notes after further 
acknowledging test evidence of obstruction, he describes her 
impairment at that time as follows: 
"The patient is to use elastic stockings, elevate the 
extremities 20 minutes or 30 minutes twice a day and get 
into employment which permits walking and avoids all day 
sitting and all day standing. She was given instructions 
about the avoidance of the danger of phlebitis, such as 
infections on her feet, injuries, broken legs, operations. 
It was suggested that she have her extremeties elevated 
during any surgeries that she might have and to be very 
careful about the conduct of a pregnancy with elevation 
and elastic compression." (A p. 4) 
According to Chadwick and her parents it was the recent 
advent under extreme exertion of minor aching and discomfort in 
the leg that brought them to consult Dr. Nielsen. But there was 
neither aching or discomfort on either normal or even quite 
strenuous use of the leg. There was no functional disability of 
the leg. After the operation she had to downgrade her 
lifestyle, find a job where she moved around rather than sitting 
or standing. There are serious risks with pregnancy. She was 
required to elevate her leg twice a day for 30 minutes. She and 
her parents both testified that Dr. Nielsen in his comments arid 
notes significantly underrated the extent of the swelling and 
disability. 
To be placed in perspective this postoperative disability 
must be contrasted with Dr. Nielsen's unqualified pre—operative 
assurances that Chadwick would be back in full use of her leg 
within 14 days after the surgery and that the symptoms of aching 
and discomfort (on extreme exertion) would be gone as well (A 
p. 2). Arrogance and recklessness appear to be the most 
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plausible explanations for his failure to disclose and 
misrepresentations to Chadwick and her father and his refusal to 
consult with Dr. Swensen who made the findings or Dr. Daines, 
who was the referring physician. 
This evidence far exceeds the minimum needed to establish a 
prima facie case both on causation and damages related to this 
"non—disclosure" cause of action. 
ISSUE II 
ALTERNATIVELY THERE WAS A PRIMA FACIE CASE BASED ON: (A) THE 
FACT THAT THE PROPRIETY OF THE TREATMENT RECEIVED IS WITHIN 
THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE OF LAYMAN; (B) EXPERT 
EVIDENCE OF DR. NIELSEN AND OTHERS; (C) WRITTEN ASSURANCES 
THAT HE WOULD NOT OPERATE IF THE INNER VEIN WAS OBSTRUCTED 
AND OF POSITIVE RESULTS; AND (D) LACK QF INFORMED CONSENT. 
Under Nixdorf 612 P.2d 348, where the non-disclosure of a 
material condition is established, as in Issue I above, the 
plaintiff in a malpractice action need not establish a standard 
of care or its breach. 
However, in the unlikely event that this Court should rule 
contrary to Issue I, it will be shown that there is competent 
evidence of a standard of care and its breach on aurty one of the 
following independent theories. 
A. The propriety of the treatment received is within the 
common knowledge and experience of layman: 
Layman understand that you do not remove a functional 
surface vein system in a leg when the only other principal inner 
vein system for blood removal is obstructed. The lack of due 
care which we claim here is not in the skill or lack of skill 
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employed by Dr. Nielsen in the removal of the vein, but rather 
in proceeding at all with surgical removal of the surface veins 
when he knew from the test that the inner veins were obstructed. 
The "common sense" exception to the requirement of expert 
testimony is the first point in Nixdorf. 612 P.2d 348 at 352: 
However, this Court has recognized certain 
exceptions to the general rule requiring 
expert testimony. Specifically, expert 
testimony is unnecessary to establish the 
standard of care owed the plaintiff where the 
propriety of the treatment received is within 
the common knowledge and experience of the layman. 
The loss of a surgical instrument or other 
paraphernalia, in the operating site, exemplifies 
this type of treatment. We explained in Fredriekson 
v. Maw: Whether a surgical operation was 
unskillfully or skillfully performed is a 
scientific question. If, however, a surgeon 
should lose the instrument with which he 
operates in the incision • . ., it would seem 
as a matter of common sense that scientific 
opinion could throw little light on the 
subject." 
This precedent can simply be paraphrased to apply here as 
follows. "If, however, a surgeon should remove the surface vein 
system from a leg when he knows that the inner vein auxi11iary 
blood removal system is obstructed, it would seem as a matter of 
common sense that scientific opinion could throw little light on 
the subject." 
B. There was ample "expert" evidence on cross examination 
of Dr. Nielsen and his 3ind other expert admissions in the 
medical record entered by Nielsen to establish a standard of 
care and its breach. 
This court has clearly established the law supporting this 
sub-point in Jennings v. Stoke. Utah, 652 p2d, 912 (1982) as 
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follows: 
Absent a situation where the propriety of the 
treatment received is within the common knowledge 
and experience of the layman," the plaintiff in a 
medical malpractice case must prove the standard 
of care by expert medical testimony. Nixdorf v. 
Hicken, Utah, 612 P.2d 348 (1980) This standard 
may be supplied by the testimony of the defendant 
himself. The use of the defendant as an adverse 
witness subject to cross—examination to establish 
part of the plaintiff's case is a trial technique 
which has been used and approved by many courts. 
The "standard" in this case is that you do not remove the 
functional surface veins in a leg when you have expert opinion, 
evidence and test results showing the inner vein system is 
obstructed (A p.1). Issue I focuses on written statements of 
Dr. Nielsen and Dr. Swensen and detail how those "admissions 
against interest" and expert opinions clearly establish the 
standard of care and its breach. All of those medical records 
were first disclosed and proferred in evidence by Dr. Nielsen at 
the inception of the trial. However, the oral testimony on 
cross—examination of Dr. Nielsen also yielded powerful evidence 
of the same standard of care but the judge, as noted in Issue 
III, erroneously limited cross-examination on this central issue 
about why Nielsen proceeded with surgery in the face of the test 
results. He did, however, read and confirm that he had written 
the letters, medical record entries and test results detailed in 
Issue I which with equal force establish by expert "evidence" 
the non-disclosure and the standard of the care well beyond the 
prima facie level. 
C. Dr. Nielsen's signed letter to Dr. Daines is a writing 
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signed by him giving assurance that he would not operate if the 
test results showed obstruction and assurance that if he did 
operate there would be a good result. Under Sec. 78—14—6 UCfl 
1953, 
Issue I establishes clearly that repeated oral assurances 
were given to Chadwick and her father that there would be no 
surgery if the test ordered by the father showed the inner vein 
to have been obstructed by the infant surgery. There were 
likewise assurances given orally to Chadwick and her father that 
if he did perform the surgery she would be back to the full use 
of the leg within 14 days after the surgery, and no risks were 
orally suggested or specified. Had those assurances remained 
unconfirmed in writing, Chadwick would have no claim under the 
cited statute. However, in a letter to Dr. Daines dated 
September 14, 1979 which Chadwick did not discover until trial, 
both of those oral assurances were committed to writing by Dr. 
Nielsen, thus satisfying the statutory requirements on that 
cause of action (A p. 2) . 
D. The same evidence which establishes an Issue I cause of 
action for non—disclosure with equal or greater force 
establishes a cause on lack of informed consent. 
Failure to disclose and lack of informed consent as applied 
to this case are closely intertwined. The legal principles are 
interrelated in the footnote 22 in Nixdorf 612 P. 2d 348 at 355 
setting forth the applicable law on lack of informed consent: 
In determining the existence and the extent 
of a physician's duty to disclose in each partic— 
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ular situation, the jury r\&Gd not depend 
exclusively on expert testimony. In 
nondisclosure cases the jury is not invariably 
functioning in an area of such technical 
complexity that it is bound to medical custom, 
as established through expert testimony, as Bin 
inexorable application of the community 
standard of reasonable care. Canterbury v. 
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
In Canterbury the court, in discussing the 
basis of disclosure required in the informed 
consent contest explained, "Nor can we ignore 
the fact that to bind the disclosure 
obligation to medical usage is to abrogate 
the decision on revelation to the physician 
alone. Respect for the patient's right of 
self determination on particular therapy 
demands a standard set by law for physicians 
rather than one which the physicians may or may 
not impose upon themselves. 464 F.2d at 784. 
This statement applied to the "non—disclosure" facts 
detailed in Issue I show that competent evidence and a prima 
facie case were established on lack of informed consent to the 
surgery. 
ISSUE III 
THE COURT ERRED IN (A) DENYING A MOTION TO AMEND THE 
COMPLAINT TO ADD CAUSES OF ACTION; (B) RESTRICTING 
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DR. NIELSEN ON THE TEST RESULTS, 
AND (C) BY REFUSING TO ALLOW THE FATHER TO TESTIFY AS AN 
EXPERT ON THE HYDRAULIC PRINCIPLES. 
The error cited in this issue only constitute prejudicial 
error in the event that the Court would rule against Chadwick on 
Issue I and all the independent sub—issues on Issue II. 
Nevertheless, brief arguments ar^e made with the principal 
objective of obtaining directives as to the proper conduct of a 
new trial on remand. 
A. The Trial Court erred in denying Chadwick*s motion to 
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amend the complaint adding counts to conform to the evidence 
produced by Nielsen at the first non-jury bi—frucated trial. 
The first bi—frucated trial on the statute of limitations 
issue yielded evidence adduced by Nielsen which supported new 
counts of malpractice not included in the original complaint. 
Based on this "new" evidence, Chadwick moved to amend the 
complaint to add counts on failure to disclose, Issue I; written 
assurances, Issue II C, and lack of informed consent, Issue II 
D. (R. pg. 79). At the beginning of the jury portion of the 
trial, the Judge first denied the motion to amend (R. pg. 113) 
and then proceeded to allow both parties to produce evidence 
which supported those new counts as reflected by the factual 
statements and arguments on all previous issues. By so ruling, 
the Judge clearly violated the express mandate of Rule 15 (b). 
The evidence supporting the amendment had already been offered 
by Nielsen and received. It is likely that the Judge sensed 
that a new trial was necessary because of error committed prior 
to the motion for a directed verdict related to the complaint 
amendment. Also, Chadwick had argued between trials that it 
would be better to make a 54 (b) U.R. C. P. ruling on the judge's 
bi—frucated damage theory than go through a useless jury trial 
on that insupportable damage severance theory. (See R. pg. 77, 
87 & 88). 
B. The Trial Court erred by refusing right of cross-
examination of Dr. Nielsen on why he proceeded with surgery when 
the test showed obstruction. 
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The most critical sand relevant issue for cross-examination 
of Dr. Nielsen was bringing to the light of day how he justified 
going forward with the surgery when he knew the test report 
showed the inner veins were obstructed. The judge's sustaining 
spurious objections to "incriminating" questions on this key 
issue was not only reversible error but may reflect the judge's 
reluctance to preside over a trial involving evidence of 
aggrevated misconduct of a member of the esteemed medical 
profession- (TR. 4/16 pg. 55 & 56). 
C. The Trial Court erred in ruling that Mr. Chadwick did 
not possess sufficient expertise so that he could testify as to 
the hydraulic principles related to the veins as a system for 
removal of blood from the leg. 
Duane G- Chadwick, plaintiff's father, testified that 
he was a professor of electrical engineering at Utah State 
University. During most of his professional life, he had 
applied electrical engineering expertise to fluid mechanics 
problems aund held several patents on pumping and fluid flow 
systems. (TR, 4/17 pg. 7) As Becky's (Chadwick's) father and 
health care decision maker he had not only carefully applied his 
own knowledge to her infant surgery leg problems but had 
frequently integrated his own knowledge with consultations with 
three brothers—in—law, a radiologist, a general and plastic 
surgeon, and ^n anesthesiologist. (TR. pg. 67-81) 
The court while allowing him to testify that he would not 
have allowed surgery if he had been informed of the inner vein 
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test results, erroneously refused to allow him to explain why on 
the theory that Drm Nielsen aiY^d the medical profession had far* 
more expertise than Mr. Chadwick, and also ruling that his 
expertise fell short of sufficiency to qualify him as an 
"expert". Mr. Chadwick9s explanation as to why he would not 
have allowed the surgery to proceed if he had known of the test 
results is admissable on multiple grounds. 
Firstly, under Rule 56 (1) U.R.E. the court erred in not 
finding that Mr. Chadwick, as Chadwick1 s health CBL^G decision 
maker, could give his opinion concerning the effect of the test 
on his decision since it was "(a) . . rationally based upon the 
perceptions of the witness and (b) are (was) helpful to a clear 
understanding of his testimony or to the determination of fact 
in issue." 
Secondly under Rule 56 (2) U.R.E. the court erred in not 
finding that Mr. Chadwick had sufficiently greater knowledge 
about the fluid mechanics principles than the jury, and at a 
minimum he was entitled to impart that knowledge to the jury, 
subject to cross examination by Stewart Hanson, Jr. Esq. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in the record propelIs this case far beyond 
the demarcation line between a prima facie case and the absence 
thereof on all counts and into the realm of fraudulent 
concealment and surgery in reckless disregard of Chadwick's 
health. Dr. Nielsen's conduct offends that basic right of self 
determination as to what shall be done with the patient's body. 
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The conversion by aggrevated malpractice of a fully functional 
leg by surgery into devastating permanent impairment and 
disability of a young woman is the injurious result. 
The Court should overule the Trial Court's granting of a 
directed verdict for the Defendant and rGtnairtd the case for trial 
on the merits with proper instructions to prevent recurrance of 
the other cited errors. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 16th day of January, 1986. 
Daines & Plowman 
t v - / ^ 
David R. Daines 
Attorney for Appellant 
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of Ja.nu.anry^ 1986, I 
mailed four exact copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
to Respondent's Attorneys at the following address: 
Stewart M. Hanson Jr., Esq-
Francis J. C^mGy^ Esq. 
3UITTER, AXLAND & ARMSTRONG 
175 South West Temple, Seventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
David R. Daines 
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ANNEX 
Date < H 4 - n 
Nam, chad^ 'ck , 1 ^ ^ ^ 
Hospital No. ( J P C J C t f S O S 
Room No. 
P H L E B O R H E O G R A M R E P O R T 
Interpretation: 
Right Left 
Normal 
Abnormal 
Equivocal 
Remarks: 
OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS: 
1.' If the tracing is interpreted as abnormal or equivocal, the patient should be considered to have deep venous 
thrombosis until proven otherwise. 
2. The P.R.G. is a diagnostic procedure. Although serial tracings show improvement, this fact alone should not 
be used to determine ambulation, discharge, or cessation of anti-coagulant therapy. These depend on clinical 
judgement. 
3. A negative P.R.Q. does not rule out the possibility of deep venous thrombosis days later. 
4. A negative P.R.G. does not rule out the possibility of pulmonary embolism (the thrombus may have broken 
loose as a whole, or it may have risen from the pelvis, i.e. hypogastric veins). In patients with pulmonary embo-
lism and a negative P.R.G., serial tracings are advisable to identify propagation of thrombus from the hypo-
gastric veins to the iiiiac veins and to detect reformation of the thrombus. 
5. 
6. 
Respirators augment respiratory waves and thus may cause a false negative test. 
A patient whose knee cannot be flexed or who cann/xToe turned tb the 
test. 
It is difficult to do the test on people with diseases such as Parkinson's 
PERIPHERAL VASCULAR LAB Ext. . 
C.R.FORD.M.D 
iy have a false positive 
constantly. 
A - 1 
- „ w - . .a i . 325 8th Ava Salt I akp tttw Mt»K 
September lu, 1979 
John Daines, HDD. 
Logan L.D.S. Hospital 
Uth East 2nd North 
Logan, UT 3U321 
Dear Dr. Daines: RE: Rebecca Jane Chadwick 
V;e appreciated seeing Rebecca Chadwick who has a varicose vein under 
considerable pressure in the left Icwer extrerity wlnchh has recently 
becuiiie asymptomatic and produces aching and disconfort in the ler;. 
She 2iv«2 the history of having had an operation for a bone cvst 
early in her infanty and a lonr scar remains from that operation. Under-
neath the scar one can feel the saplienous vein extend the fu31 length of 
the scar and then below the knee on to the dalf the vein can still be felt. 
It is at this roint that it burst? irrco a varix. T believe that the reason 
for the varicose vasan is zr.± scar itself which fill:-- to ^ive the saise k5n«.1 
of structural support to the vessel as the normal si-in would do. There are 
no zizns of deep vein involvement^ no swellinr, no oiomentation, no dilitation 
of surface veins, nor discoloration of the skin. Mcv^ver; to be certain 
that there is no obstruction a phleborheorram will be obtained tomorrow., 
if this is nonral, I would think that she could he ^iven complete relief bv 
just a standard saphenous phlebectomy or: this side. That will be planned 
if the deep system is norrral as anticipated. 
Thank you for the opportunity of seeing this interesting patient • 
Sincerely yours, 
Talmage W. Nielsen, M.D. 
TWN/to 
A - 2 
October 5, 197^ 
John Daines, H.D. 
Logan L.D.S. Hospital 
irth East 2nd Horth 
Loraiu UT 34321 
Dear JJr. Daines: KC: Rebecca Jane Chadwick 
We appreciate having the opportunity to v;ork -»ith Rebecca OwJwfch 
v;ho developed varicose veins in She left extremity, nrobably secondary 
to surgery wliich took place for a neural in her infancy. 
The scar which was described by the surreon and heinr 2*5 inches 
long when she was three months old was 15 inches ]on£ now and underlying 
tnis waar was a largerraaarix dnd below the scar, as you know, in the leg 
m
-
m
-?r* vir-v-?- th.-nt W'-.i-.. . !. - ^ <7.^toms. 
We did a phleborheogram to make sure thattffihe deep .ivster war, not 
occluded and this showed that there v?as dampening of the pulse wave 
probably due to £ber entraxment but no luminal occlusional. Thereafter, 
the vein was stripped and the old scar excised an*) closed with a sub-
cuticular closure to imorove its appearance and a ^pillorna was renove^ 
from the groin. 
She has had a happy result from this. The lerr feels better, she 
has had no swelling,and the scar looks very much better cosmetically. 
I an glad that we elected to excise the scar because it vould have he<*v 
impossible to strip the vein without that. There r;ar. r>o much scarification 
around the vessel. I TftpfBfrws that this will take care of her swrntoms and 
improve her appearance. 
Thank you for the chance to work with her. 
Sincerely yours, 
Talxnage W. Nie l sen , M.D. 
TWN/to 
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Rebecca Jane Chadwick 
September 28, 1979, First visit following saphenous phlebectomy on the left 
and removal of a very long scar on the inside of her thigh, 15 inches in length. 
Patient's wounds are nicely healing. The steri-strips were left in place but 
the subcuticular sutures were removed. The steri-strips were removed. The 
patient was placed back in ace bandages which she will continue to wear for 
another week and then return. She is already beginning to feel an improvement 
in that leg in the way it feels. 
October 5, 1979, Letter to Dr. John Daines, M.D. 
October 9, 1979, Had had some swelling after we took her thigh wrapping off. 
I think this was mostly gravitation of fluid dcwn tissue planes along the 
site of the removal of her varicose vein to the ankle. The swelling is almost 
all gone today. She will use some compression stockings and elevating her 
legs to minimize that until all is healed up. There is still an area of 
fluid in the compartment along the vein just above the knee. 
October 23, 1979, Is having much less problem with leg swelling and every-
thing looks better. She will continue to wear panty support stockings until 
there is no more swelling and will be seen here again in one month. 
November 12, 1979, Had very little, if any, swelling now in her extremity 
which now looks good. The incision looks fine and I believe thet scar is 
going to mature to be much better than the one she had before. Patient will 
wear the stockings whenever she is wearing slacks or if she is obligated to 
sit for long periods of time. Otherwise she will be without them for dress ups. 
She will avoid prolonged sitting. 
December 10, 1979, Found a portion of the subcuticular suture approximately 
six inches long which had not been removed. It was just barily sticking out 
through the skin. We were able to find it and remove it. She is doing well. 
January 08, 1980, Patient and her family came into talk about Rebecca's 
problem. The details were explained to her namely, that she has some degree 
of extrinsic entrapment of the deep vein just above the knee where the 
operation was performed in infancy. We have no direct evidence that there 
has been an occlusion at this point. A phlebography is not warranted because 
of the risk of clot, but phleborheogram does show a respiratory reinforcement 
of the venous pulse wave which is somewhat dampened but does suggest that 
there is patency but dampening through extrensic scar, The patient is to use 
elastic stockings, elevate the extremities 20 minutes or 30 minutes twice a 
day and get into employment which permits walking and avoids all day sitting 
and all day standing. She was given instructions about the avoidance of 
the danger of phlebitis, such as infections on her feet, injuries, broken 
legs, operations. It was suggested that she have her extremities elevated 
during any surgeries that she might have and to be very careful about the 
conduct of a pregnancy with elevation and elastic compression. The parents 
and the patient seemed to understand the problem. She is not threatened. 
The skin has no pigmentation or thickening. There is almost imperceptible 
swelling but it is measured to be present. 
A - U, 
